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Background: Human resources for health represent an essential component of health systems and play a key role
to accelerate progress towards universal health coverage. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa face challenges
regarding the availability, distribution and performance of health workers, which could be in part addressed by
providing effective financial incentives.
Methods: Based on an overview of the existing literature, the paper highlights the gaps in the existing research in
low-income countries exploring the different components of health workers’ incomes. It then proposes a novel
approach to the analysis of financial incentives and delineates a research agenda, which could contribute to shed
light on this topic.
Findings: The article finds that, while there is ample research that investigates separately each of the incomes
health workers may earn (for example, salary, fee-for-service payments, informal incomes, “top-ups” and per diems,
dual practice and non-health activities), there is a dearth of studies which look at the health workers’ “complex
remuneration”, that is, the whole of the financial incentives available. Little research exists which analyses
simultaneously all revenues of health workers, quantifies the overall remuneration and explores its complexity, its
multiple components and their features, as well as the possible interaction between income components. However,
such a comprehensive approach is essential to fully comprehend health workers’ incentives, by investigating the
causes (at individual and system level) of the fragmentation in the income structure and the variability in income
levels, as well as the consequences of the “complex remuneration” on motivation and performance. This proposition
has important policy implications in terms of devising effective incentive packages as it calls for an active
consideration of the role that “complex remuneration” plays in determining recruitment, retention and motivation
patterns, as well as, more broadly, the performance of health systems.
Conclusions: This paper argues that research focusing on the health workers’ “complex remuneration” is critical to
address some of the most challenging issues affecting human resources for health. An empirical research agenda is
proposed to fill the gap in our understanding.
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Human resources for health (HRH) represent an essen-
tial component for the functioning of health systems [1]
and play a key role to accelerate progress towards uni-
versal health coverage [2-4]. However, many low-income
countries face challenges with reference to availability of
health workers, which is the supply of qualified workers;
distribution, that is, recruitment and retention of health
workers where they are needed; and performance, which
is the productivity and the quality of their work [5]. The-
oretical research has explored the factors underlying
health workers’ motivation [6,7], and empirical studies
and systematic reviews have looked extensively at the
factors (or combination of factors) that improve recruit-
ment and retention and enhance motivation. They find
that the possible strategies are multiple and include
financial benefits (pay and other benefits, such as pension,
insurance, accommodation), indirect benefits (subsidized
transport, food, child care) and non-financial benefits
(access to training, social recognition, supervision, etc.)
[6]. While some studies suggest that a payment or salary is
an essential precondition for the motivation of health
workers [8], others argue that non-financial incentives
can be highly effective, especially for the attraction and
retention in rural areas [9,10]. Yet, most scholars agree
that “bundles of interventions” addressing multiple factors
and combining financial and non-financial incentives
work better than interventions limited to one single type
of incentive [10-13].
In this article, we focus exclusively on the financial com-
ponent of incentive packages provided to health workers
and specifically on health workers’ remunerations and rev-
enues. We argue that, while there are various bodies of lit-
erature in health economics and health policy and systems
research in low-income settings that look separately at
some of the incomes and examine the effect of each on
health workers’ motivation, there has been a general lack
of attention to the “complex remuneration” of health
workers in a comprehensive way, including the whole of
the financial incentives and revenue sources available, and
to how the different incomes may interact. Indeed, in
most low-income settings, the remuneration of health
workers is not composed of a single type of payment but
includes combinations of payment mechanisms, which
differ by source of funding, contract agreements, features
such as regularity and inclusion of “deferred” compensa-
tion (pensions), and task requirements. The thorough un-
derstanding of the entire remuneration of health workers
and each of its components, as well as the acknowledge-
ment of its complexity by researchers and policy-makers,
is extremely relevant in order to devise effective overall in-
centive packages.
This article first describes the perspectives taken by
the existing economics and health system literature onHRH remuneration in low-income settings and then in-
troduces a broader approach to the study of health
workers’ financial incentive environment which has thus
far been little explored. The article concludes with some
reflections on the policy and research implications of
our proposition.
Perspectives on HRH remuneration in the existing
literature
The remuneration of workers, along with the related is-
sues of incentives and motivation, have been discussed
and analysed by different bodies of literature, both theor-
etical and empirical – the latter focused mostly on high-
income settings. One of the most broadly adopted
conceptual frameworks to explore the role of remuner-
ation and incentives in defining behaviour in work rela-
tionships is “agency theory”. Agency theory studies a
setting where a “principal” delegates authority to an
“agent” who is working on behalf of the principal to per-
form a task. Because of her imperfect information on
the agent’s effort and skills, the principal devises con-
tracts that include rewards or sanctions (usually in the
form of a financial remuneration) to elicit the desired
behaviour [14]. Mainstream economic models predict
(under a series of assumptions, including that of “ma-
terialistic self-interest” of individuals) which type of in-
centives should be included in the “ideal” contract
(for example, piece-rate payments, fixed salary or a mix),
applying concepts from institutional economics, such as
“high-powered” and “low-powered” incentives [15,16].
Most recently, economic work began expanding the
microfoundations of agency theory to allow for non-
rational behaviour and social preferences of individuals.
Going beyond revenue and effort as the sole explanatory
factors, behavioural models add psychological factors to
the agent’s utility maximization problem. These factors
include inequality aversion, teamwork, and professional
and identity norms and have been explored by theoret-
ical and empirical literature [16,17]. The complex
process of the motivation of health workers and the role
of factors beyond the financial remuneration (including
intrinsic determinants, the work context and the broader
societal culture) has been acknowledged widely, and
their study crosses many disciplinary boundaries, includ-
ing economics, psychology, organizational development,
human resource management and sociology [7]. While
we do not aim to present a systematic review of the vast
and varied research available, in order to provide a basis
for our argument, we focus here on a selected portion of
the health economics and health policy and system re-
search literature, which looks at health workers’ financial
incentives in low-income settings.
In some of the health economics literature, health
workers’ remuneration arrangements are seen as “provider
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health workers could be receiving a salary, a fee-for-service
payment, capitation or a payment based on their perform-
ance. The empirical literature on the incentives created by
the different types of payment has been reviewed by many
[18-23]. Its focus is found to be predominantly on high-
income countries, as fewer, if any, economic analyses have
been performed in low- and middle-income settings. It is
generally implied that health workers in low- and middle-
income countries receive a salary for their public sector
activities and are paid a fee-for-service for their private
ones [24].
Yet, the actual composition of their remuneration is
much more complex, as shown by empirical work car-
ried out in low-income countries. Indeed, these studies
point out to the fact that the categories of income
sources defined in the health economics literature, and
their mutual exclusivity, are less relevant in those con-
texts. Roenen et al. [25] identified 8 categories (and 28
sub-categories) of medical and non-medical income-
generating activities, ranging from agro-pastoral and
commercial work to secondary jobs within the public
sector (for example, teaching), per diems and premiums,
private practice and informal incomes, such as gifts from
patients, and appropriation of public resources. In prac-
tice, very few studies have quantified the overall remu-
neration of health workers presenting information on
each of these components. These papers generally over-
look the complex remuneration and its potential conse-
quences on health workers’ motivation as an issue in
itself and focus on other questions, namely the impact of
changes on HRH (including their income) with the
introduction of a fee exemption scheme [26,27], the ad-
equacy of health workers’ income and the fiscal and
macroeconomic aspects of health workers’ remuneration
[28] or the strategic tools available for policy-makers to
control health workers’ behaviour [29].
Other research has focused on the income of health
workers in order to explore their individual “financial
coping strategies”, that is, the ways workers deal with
their financial needs. This body of work aims at asses-
sing the adequacy of the public health workforce salary
in comparison to alternative work [30] or at investigat-
ing the consequences of the coping strategies on the
public health system, in order to devise policies to re-
duce the need to adopt such strategies [31-33], or to put
in place performance-based bonuses sufficiently high to
incentivize health workers and compensate their in-
creased efforts [34]. Along similar lines, a diverse body
of literature focuses on those sources of income that are
considered “informal” or downright “illegal”, looking at
dual practice and moonlighting [35-39] as well as activ-
ities within facilities, such as charging under-the-table
fees and selling pharmaceuticals [31,40,41]. The mainobjective of these studies is to attempt the, obviously diffi-
cult, assessment of the level of each of those incomes and
to discuss their implications in terms of the distortions
they can create on the main public job (for example, com-
petition for time and absenteeism) and on the governance
of the health system.
Other studies have focused on the widespread practice
of external organizations of paying salary supplementa-
tions (“top-ups”) and “per diems” to health workers. Al-
though meant to reimburse real expenses, per diems are
usually paid well beyond the level necessary to cover the
actual costs on the activities concerned, and they have
attracted much criticisms because of the distortions and
abuse to which they are subject and the increase in cor-
ruption that they may cause [42-46]. From their perspec-
tive, international donors are aware of the critical role
they play by providing unofficial supplements to health
workers’ salaries. The open discussion held at the 1998
International Conference in Lisbon [47-51] is particu-
larly useful in this respect. However, little empirical work
exists to measure this impact and its consequences. An
exception is the body of literature on the “system-wide
effects” of Global Health Initiatives which looks at in-
centives created by such programmes when they include
remuneration to health workers. It is found that, indeed,
Global Health Initiatives have contributed substantially
to salary top-ups and per diems paid mostly for in-
service training [52-55]. The main concern is the
evidence of their consequences in terms of “brain drain”
from public posts to NGOs and bilateral agencies [56-58],
as well as of additional workload, distortion from routine
activities and absenteeism in public (usually policy-
making) positions [59-61].
With the widespread introduction, in many countries
of sub-Saharan Africa, of performance-based financing
(PBF) schemes, which often entail a bonus for staff, an-
other payment is available for health workers. The core
concept of PBF schemes is to make use of incentives in
order to promote better health service coverage and re-
sults, by linking financial incentives to desired outputs
and encouraging increased effort [62,63]. Critics of the
approach have suggested that PBF schemes may
promote “gaming” practices, distortions in service deliv-
ery in favour of services included in the scheme and
crowding-out the intrinsic motivation of health workers
[64,65]. Empirical evidence from low-income countries
on how PBF schemes affect health workers’ motivation
is still limited, but some preliminary results are available.
The analysis of an early PBF scheme in Rwanda showed
the sharp increase in staff productivity [66]. In Benin,
with the introduction of two pilot PBF projects, health
workers report being more professional and respectful of
standards, but their motivation is limited by the perceived
unfairness in bonus distribution [67]. A quantitative study
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PBF scheme led to more effort from health workers
without crowding-out of non-targeted services, staff con-
flicts, gaming or free-riding. However, the scheme, be-
cause of the effect it had of reducing the overall
remuneration of health workers, led to a decrease in
their intrinsic motivation [68].
Most recently, research has explored HRH incentive
issues from a labour market perspective [5,69-71]. This
body of work argues that to address issues of maldistri-
bution, low retention and poor performance of health
workers, a shift of focus from health workforce planning
to other factors, such as labour market dynamics and
the behavioural responses and individual preferences, is
needed. The proposed approach looks at the national
and international market for health workers and at the
competing alternatives to public employment, such as
private practice and migration to other countries. Al-
though this work allows for the possibility of dual prac-
tice, the “price” considered for the health labour market
is represented by the “wage rate” and there is limited at-
tention to the existence and consequences of simultan-
eous, multiple incomes.The complex remuneration of health workers: policy
implications
Although most of the studies reviewed above describe the
remuneration of health workers or rather some compo-
nents of it, with few exceptions [26,27,29,34], they do not
adopt a comprehensive approach reflecting the overall
financial incentives and encompassing all incomes avail-
able. Importantly, however, taken as a whole, this litera-
ture points out to the existence and relevance of the
phenomenon that we call “complex remuneration”, which
is the fact that health workers earn their living from a var-
iety of sources and activities. We believe that a broader
and more integrated understanding of the financial incen-
tive environment available for health workers is necessary
and of high-policy relevance. While the work done so far
tends to reflect on different incomes separately, further re-
search is needed on all these elements simultaneously.
Such research would allow describing and quantifying the
overall income and each of its components, including
their relative importance and their variation across indi-
viduals. Moreover, it could explore hypotheses (i) relating
to the causes of differences in income structure and levels
between individuals, as well as within and across countries
and their linkages with the fragmentation of the health
systems, and (ii) on the potential interactions between in-
comes, the incentives created by the complex remuner-
ation structure and their consequences on health workers’
motivation, behaviour and, more broadly, on the health
system performance.From a policy perspective, the issues raised by the
complex remuneration pose numerous new challenges
in order to establish rational and aligned financial incen-
tive packages to recruit, retain and motivate the health
workforce. While some guidance already exists for devis-
ing health workers’ incentives and addressing attraction
and retention issues [72,73], under the assumption that
the overall income of health workers depends on various
and interacting factors beyond the ones that are usually
considered, such as individual education and type of
posting, the design of financial incentives becomes in-
creasingly difficult. Other elements and factors should
now be considered, such as the opportunities for exter-
nal payments or for medical and non-medical activities
beyond the main employment. The need for broader
consideration of revenue sources beyond the salary is
valid for any type of financial payment or strategy that
is to be introduced, from rural allowances to PBF bo-
nuses which have to take into consideration the overall
income of health workers in order to be sufficient to
produce an impact on motivation and, at the same
time, to avoid the “blurred” and ineffective incentives
created by the accumulation of various payments [67].
Moreover, the complex remuneration of health workers in
many low-income settings presents specific challenges in
that multiple payers and lines of accountability exist, with
potentially clashing agendas that influence the activities
health workers perform. This is different from multiple
payment systems in high-income countries, where a single
principal is more able to align incentives [74].
Policy-makers and their partners at the national level
are called to pay increased attention to the wider financial
incentive environment, as well as to engage in reflections
to inform HRH reforms going beyond the issue of salaries
and governmental allowances. The policy-making pro-
cesses must be supported by the collection of relevant
data (including qualitative) and the creation of an infor-
mation base on these issues. Additionally, the policy de-
bate at the central level should be framed within the
broader macrolevel context of HRH incentives (which in-
cludes issues such as caps on total wage bills) and should
take into consideration how microlevel strategies for the
motivation of health workers can be affected and at times
constrained by macrolevel conditions. Finally, beyond the
national level, it has to be acknowledged that some of the
incomes are subject to and influenced by local-level
dynamics (Bertone MP, Witter S: An exploration of the
political economy dynamics shaping health worker incen-
tives in three districts in Sierra Leone, submitted). For ex-
ample, private practice is usually more widespread in
urban areas rather than in rural ones, and depending on
the geographical distribution of donors and NGOs, per
diems, top-ups or other payments may be more common
or higher in certain areas of a country than in others.
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remuneration
Further research is needed in order to support policy de-
sign and decisions, tailored to the specificity of the con-
texts. An innovative agenda of health policy and systems
research would require exploring the complex remuner-
ation of health workers and refining the necessary tools
to capture it. The hypotheses that motivate such re-
search agenda are multiple, and the main issues and re-
search questions that could be explored under this
proposition are described below and in Table 1.
First, a description of the level of fragmentation and
complexity of the overall income in a country as well as
across countries would be extremely useful to explore
what are the revenues available to health workers, in-
cluding their absolute and relative levels. Such work
could focus on the causes and determinants of the in-
comes, looking at variables at the individual, facility and
geographical level (for example, which health workers
receive each income? Who receives more for each in-
come?). Furthermore, hypotheses on the consequences
of the fragmented and complex remuneration should
also be investigated. Different sources, levels and fea-
tures of each revenue – such as predictability, regular-
ity, link with deferred compensation (that is, pension
and increases with career progression), type of contract
(for example, performance-based or fixed), source of
payment and tasks required (for example, routine or
disease-specific and within facility or outside) – may
play a key role in affecting health workers’ behaviour
and motivation and therefore performance, in different
ways. Moreover, specific requirements related to in-
come component may affect time spent by health
workers on different activities (for example, top-ups for
disease/service-specific work may increase time spent
on those) and the presence at work (for example, in-
comes earned outside of the facility, such as per diems
or non-health-related work). These issues could be fur-
ther researched with a comprehensive approach. Other
key issues are the individual perceptions about the suffi-
ciency, fairness and transparency in the allocation of the
revenues [75,76], as well as social and cultural views over
certain incomes, all of which are likely to affect the motiv-
ation of health workers. For example, it is possible that, in
some contexts, the government salary may be a relatively
limited and unreliable source of income but perceived as
extremely important either because it is linked to pension
benefits and job security [76,77] or because health workers
assign a significance beyond its immediate monetary value.
In the DR Congo, Fox et al. found that this was the case as
receiving a salary is seen as a social recognition of the
health worker’s role [78]. Similarly, some revenues may be
low in absolute terms but they could enable access to
other “goods” (such as training or social status) or,because of their regularity and predictability, could act as
income “stabilizers” and therefore be considered important
by health workers. A further unexplored hypothesis relates
to the potential interaction between income components.
If we consider the possibility of earning simultaneously dif-
ferent revenues, some incomes could play a role either as a
substitute for meagre official payments or as a comple-
ment to those, even when their level is sufficient. For ex-
ample, are revenues for activities outside of the health
sector, such as agriculture or business, earned to “make
ends meet”, or are those incomes available only to workers
who earn enough from other sources and are therefore
able to make further investments?
Turning to the overall revenue, it is likely that, given the
fragmentation, the total income may differ for health
workers even within the same cadre and level of educa-
tion. In this case, it will be important to assess the level of
income variability and investigate its causes. These differ-
ences could be a used as a motivation tool by incentivizing
health workers to work in rural areas or ensuring their
career progression, especially if remuneration is transpar-
ent and fragmentation reduced. On the other hand, these
differences may be a possible source of inequity between
individuals and demotivation. Research could explore by
which income component(s) differences in total income
are driven and/or whether these differences are related to
characteristics at the individual level, such as gender, or at
the facility level (rural or urban location) or at the geo-
graphical level (different districts or provinces). Based on
answers to such questions, it is possible to reflect on the
policy relevance of the income differences: are differences
justifiable and used to address availability, distribution and
retention issues, or do they cause unacceptable inequal-
ities? Are inequalities avoidable and policy-amenable? If
so, what are the policy tools to address them? For ex-
ample, a study of doctors in Viet Nam found that the dif-
ference in opportunities for financial revenues between
areas of posting favoured those in urban areas. The fact
that these differences mostly originated outside official
pay channels and were of large magnitude presented a
considerable policy challenge to address distribution im-
balances [29].
Another set of hypotheses concerns the difference in
the complexity of income composition that there may be
within and across countries. A question in this case is
whether the fragmentation of revenue sources and the
variation of total income for similar health workers have
local determinants and/or mirror the fragmentation of
the health system and increase in contexts where nu-
merous (external) actors are involved, such as in fragile
states/regions or where private practice is widespread.
The call for a novel approach focused on the overall
remuneration and including sources of income that are
both formal and informal also requires refining existing
Table 1 Main hypotheses of the proposed research agenda on HRH complex remuneration and possible research
questions
Main issues/hypotheses Possible research questions
Complexity/fragmentation of income sources • What are the different incomes available for health workers and the level and relative importance of
each income?
• To which type of health workers is each source of income available – including health worker
characteristics at the individual level (such as age, gender, level of education, years in the health
sector and role within the facility) and at the facility level (type of facility, rural/urban, size, location
within the country, etc.)?
• What are the individual- and facility-level determinants that define the level (amount) of each
income received/earned?
• How do the different incomes interact with each other? Are certain incomes used as a substitute
for the lack/low level of others or rather as complements?
• How are the different incomes used by health workers?
Consequences of the complex remuneration • What are the features of the different revenues (for example, present vs. deferred and stable vs.
irregular, performance-based vs. fixed), and how do these affect motivation and performance?
• How do health workers perceive their incomes, in terms of fairness, of being sufficient to motivate
them, of transparency on what influences them, etc.? How do these perceptions affect their
motivation and performance?
• What are the consequences of the income fragmentation on the motivation and performance?
(for example, does the accumulation of payments lead to “blurriness” and decrease effectiveness of
incentives?)
• How do different incomes and their fragmentation affect the time spent on different activities,
levels of absenteeism and accountability links to different payers?
Differences in total income across health
workers of the same cadre
• What is the measure of differences of income across similar health workers? (that is, same cadre/
level of education and type of post and role within facility)
• What are the drivers at the individual and facility level of these differences?
• What are the consequences of the inequalities of total income? Are they justifiable and have a
motivating effect (for example, incentivizing rural workers)? Or do they cause unacceptable
inequalities and hamper availability, retention and distribution, as well as motivation (for example,
urban workers or workers in some areas have more opportunities to earn some revenues from
private practice or donors’ support)?
Differences within countries • Are there income differences (both overall and for each component) between health workers in
different areas of the same country?
• What are the causes of these differences? (for example, rural/urban divide, different socio-economic
contexts, historical legacies, political economy dynamics at local level and presence of external
actors)
Differences across countries • Do health workers in some countries have more complex incomes than in others? Why?
(for example, different health system architecture and health system fragmentation, role of private
sector, existence of free health care policies, level of health funding and fragile/post-conflict settings)
• Are individual differences for similar health workers more important in some countries than others?
Why?
Designing financial incentive packages • Which tools and methods are needed to produce context-specific evidence in order to design
rational and effective incentive packages for health workers?
• What is the role of governments and their development partners in reducing inequalities and
fragmentation of health workers’ income?
• What are the policy implications of complex remuneration (for example, its effects on policy
options and effectiveness), and what are the options for addressing it?
• How are individual-level strategies for the motivation of health workers affected and constrained by
macrolevel conditions (for example, wage bills caps)?
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ing and defining new ones. Informal revenues are ex-
tremely difficult and perhaps impossible to precisely
calculate because of the reticence of the health workers
to openly declare them and the absence of records.
However, some potentially useful techniques that allowrough estimates have been explored [34,40]. Revenues
that are not harmonized but vary for each health worker,
such as top-ups and per diems, are difficult to collect
other than through individual surveys, given the diffi-
culty of obtaining disaggregated data from donors’ data-
bases. Mixed method approaches have also been found
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the perceptions and views of health workers on their dif-
ferent revenues [34]. Overall, it seems that the ideal ap-
proach would entail a combination of different methods,
integrated into survey or interview tools that are prac-
tical and feasible to administer. Although collecting data
on incomes routinely would be of high relevance for
policy-makers, this possibility seems unlikely. As for the
interpretation of results, while it may prove difficult to
go beyond the context specificity of the findings of this
type of research, cross-country comparisons may help to
improve generalizability and find common patterns
across contexts.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued for an increased attention to
the wider financial incentive environment and a better un-
derstanding of the complex remuneration of health
workers, its determinants and the factors that underlie it,
as well as its wide-ranging consequences for behaviour
and performance. As recognized in the introduction, our
perspective is limited because of its exclusive focus on fi-
nancial incentives. In fact, we recognize that effective
HRH strategies consist of “bundles of interventions”,
which incorporate both financial and non-financial incen-
tives, and our proposition does not aim to underestimate
the importance of other non-financial motivation strat-
egies. However, precisely because financial and non-
financial incentives are complexly interrelated, remuner-
ation is an essential element of any HRH strategy. It can-
not be fully taken into consideration for policy-making
without exploring and understanding the overall complex
remuneration of health workers and the role it plays in de-
termining recruitment, retention and motivation, as well
as, more broadly, the performance of health systems and
the progress towards universal health care.
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